e online ads trading platform plays a crucial role in connecting publishers and advertisers and generates tremendous value in facilitating the convenience of our lives. It has been evolving into a more and more complicated structure. In this paper, we consider the problem of maximizing the revenue for the seller side via utilizing proper reserve price for the auctions in a dynamical way.
INTRODUCTION
Online advertising have been increasingly important for the market participants. In a report by Mckinsey [3] , the digital ads marketplace has seen a strong growth and digital ads sale will reach $231 billion by 2019. Before the emerging of ad exchange, there are many intermediaries in the value chain between publishers and advertisers each taking a slice of ad market share. Both the advertisers and publishers spend signi cant time working on where and how to buy and sell so that impressions go to the right audience. e ad exchange solves these problems and simpli es the process of serving users, advertisers and publishers in a much more e cient way.
Yahoo's BRXD (Yahoo display ads exchange) is one of the major trading platforms that serves numerous advertisers and publishers. It enables the potential buyer to reach hundreds of millions of users across the world at a single platform, from which a pool of specialized targeting audiences is chosen according to the buyer's individualized campaign goals. e centralized trading structure enables small buyers who have limited budget to reach a large variety of users that would not be possible without a platform. In general, the advertising inventory is bought and sold on a per-impression basis by running a real-time auction. e system has evolved into a stage such that it is programmed to be able to run millions of auctions, serve the corresponding ads, record the payment, ght with fraud, … all such kinds of procedures within one single second. In this paper, we are focused on a method to determine how bidders are charged at impression level.
When calculating the transaction prices, the industry generally uses the so called popular standard second price auction design with a reserve price: a valid top bidder (the winner) will pay the second bidder's price or the reserve price, whichever is higher. e current BRXD has a very low global reserve price (a few cents) for all auctions, and are not supportive for dynamic scenarios. One challenge is that it is di cult to model bidder behavior and its evolution as auctions are running on various types of inventories. On one hand, over-predicting is quite dangerous since it would result in blocking of all good bids and publisher su ers from the opportunity cost. On the other hand, extremely conservative reserve price is useless since second price is already served as good price support. As a platform, Yahoo has substantial chunk of inventories owned by itself, thus a seller revenue improvement also bene ts Yahoo's revenue performance directly.
Second price auction
e online marketplace of ads trading is similar to the traditional item auctions in terms of winning rule. ere are extensive studies in the auction designs in the context of traditional economic regime. Driven by the goal to maximize revenue, one may be wondering why the publisher can resist the temptation to charge the winner the top price instead of second price.
One of the major ndings of auction theory is the celebrated Revenue equivalence theorem. Early equivalence results focused on a comparison of revenue in the most common auctions. e rst such proof, for the case of two buyers and uniformly distributed values was by Vickrey [15] in 1961. Later Riley & Samuelson [14] proved a much more general result. ( ite independently and soon a er, this was also derived by Myerson [11] in 1981). e revenue equivalence theorem states that any allocation mechanism or auction that satis es the main assumptions of the benchmark model will lead to the same expected revenue for the seller. e main assumptions includes bidders are risk-neutral, their valuation for the inventory is independently and identically distributed (i.i.d) and the payments must depend on bids.
It is a well-known result that in rst price auction, where the player with the highest bid simply pays whatever it bids, a Nash equilibrium is that each player bids such that everybody bids the expected value of second highest bid. is result is also based on the main assumptions. In the real-time ads bidding environment, second price auction awards an impression to the ad with the highest bid, but records the revenue of the impression as the second highest bid. It is optimal for the bidders to bid at its own valuation of the impression under the same assumptions. For both auction mechanisms, the impressions are allocated to the same bidders with the same expected revenue, this is the famous revenue equivalence theorem in auction theory. From the bidders point of view, the second price auction is de nitely more a ractive than rst price auction at rst glance. However, the above main assumptions are not always true in realistic ads trading platform (actually it is almost never true for Yahoo's exchange). For instance, some bidders shared very similar bidding formula for certain inventories, it is hard to verify whether their bids are independent. Moreover, there are many types of bidders with di erent priorities, some put deliver rate over CPM (cost per thousand impression) goal and are willing to overbid; whereas some bidders are short of budget and prefer shading their bids. No one can guarantee that the new equilibrium will ensure a dominant strategy of truth bidding, see [4, 5] . e idea of reserve price (also called oor price) is to set up a lowest price for each auction. Instead of paying the second bid price, the winner will pay the higher of second bid and reserve price, as if the seller place a bid at the reserve price. is mechanism prevailed the online bidding market since it essentially provides a protection of transaction prices for the publishers. Se ing a good reserve price for the inventory is an interesting question. If it is too high (greater than rst bid), the inventory will be le unsold and incurs opportunity cost. However, if the reserve price is too low (lower than the second bid), it fails to protect the publisher from auctions with low second bid and high rst bid prices. Ideally the reserve price should be between the top two bids:
Second bid < Reserve price ≤ Top bid.
Besides the static reserve price, publishers can also set a variable price with a minimum and maximum, which enables an ad to win at lower prices for less valuable inventory and higher prices for higher value inventory.
Past work and our method
Under the second price auction (also referred as Vickrey auction) scheme, reserve price is critical to maximize revenue (we consider seller side revenue throughout this paper), this is proved by Myerson in 1981 in his classic Nobel prize winning work [11] . Actually Myerson showed that if the valuations are drawn independently and identically from a distribution satisfying a regularity assumption, the optimal auction takes the form of a second price auction with a reserve price. Furthermore, if the bidders are risk neutral, Riley and Samuelson [14] con rmed that the second price auction yields the same expected revenue as the rst price auction.
We noticed some recent works [2, 6, 10] on the evolution of bidder's strategy under repeated auctions. People have di erent approaches to formulate and solve the optimization related problems. One of the pioneer work [9] formulate the optimal revenue problem as a learning problem and present a full theoretical analysis on it. [7] aims to achieve almost optimal expected revenue for arbitrary bidder valuation distribution. e key idea in which is to associate each bidder with another that has the same a ribute, with the second bidder's valuation acting as a random reserve price for the rst. [12] studied lazy and eager versions of reserve prices, the idea in which is similar to another version of the so reserve price. e optimization problem for the buyer side has been well studied, [17] investigates the repeated version of Shubik's dollar auctions and discussed e ect of di erent player types.
It seems at rst sight that having a reserve price will de nitely help improving the publisher yield in second price auctions. is is not always true, for instance, the impact of so reserve prices in advertisers is studied in [18] , it "puts advertisers in an unfavorable position and could damage the eco-system". In the same paper, the authors also evaluate the performance of bidding strategy. In [5] , the authors nd that proper adjustment of the reserve price is key in achieving pro table for the publisher to try selling all impressions in the exchange before utilizing the alternative channel. Our e orts in nding the optimal reserve price in order to optimize the seller revenue is in this background, we come up with an e cient model that are completely di erent from those in previous literatures that works great for our platform.
Since the top two bids vary from auction to auction, a constant reserve price across all inventory types will not be granule enough. An easy way to add uctuations is to perform manual adjustments to the reserve price based on certain features. When the top two bid prices exhibit high correlation with time, the manual way would somewhat improve the publisher revenue. Nonetheless, it is in general a low e cient way to have manpower involved in auctions that usually complete in several mini-second. A more e cient way is to set the reserve price for each auction automatically.
Before we come up with this data-driven method, we have already implemented a parametric model that works pre y well in our video platform [1] but not as expected in the display marketplace. In [1] , the authors use a game theory based parametric method that is very e ective in computing the reserve price for sparse and high ranged auctions, such as the video marketplaces, where the bid price can be several dozens of dollars and number of bidders for each auction is small. e parametric model [1] assumes the bids follow some certain distributions, and historical bids data is used to t the parameters. Under the benchmark assumptions a closed form solution can be derived by solving a di erential equation. As we have discussed above, the benchmark assumptions is in doubt and it is hard to evaluate how much impact it could bring to the accuracy of the model. us the true distribution of the bidder's valuation is very di cult to obtain. For BRXD, bids are much more dense and pricing range is narrower than video marketplace. One problem we found is that the parametric model is hard to achieve statistical signi cant revenue li anymore.
Since the display marketplace has a higher capacity and are more competitive than video marketplace, there are all kinds of players that contribute a lot more noises. We started by not assuming any known type of distributions for the bids, but just assume that the top two bids are relatively stable for certain type of inventories. is is a fundamental di erence from the parametric approach and is in a more data driven spirit. Noticed that the optimal reserve price only depends on the top two bids, we will only focused on study the top bid and the gap between the top two bids, eliminating the requirement that all bids are independently identically distributed.
To further reduce the impact of noise, we only recommend an e ective reserve price for those inventories that are predicted to be high value by our model, and leave the other ones' e ective reserve price (see Section 2.1) unchanged. We say that an inventory is of high value if its potential top bid is greater than some threshold. e motivation for the choice of operating only on high value inventory is that we can achieve very good AUC with the features in our hand, and the implementation is relatively easy. Since the revenue margin narrows down when the top two bids are close, we also build a cluster of classi ers to estimates the price separation between the top two bids. For instance, if the price separation is small, the ROI (risk over return) for implementing an aggressive reserve price will be very low. We use the predicted separation as an indicator to determine whether an aggressive reserve price should be enforced or not.
FEATURES AND INVENTORY CLASSIFICATION BUCKETS 2.1 Multiple Reserve Prices
In online auction design, the reserve price is set before the bids come, any bids below the reserve will be blocked before enter into the ranking algorithm. We call this type of reserve price hard. For a comprehensive ads exchange platform, there can be multiple types of hard reserve price, such as systemwide reserve prices, uniform reserve price, deal reserve price, etc. e uniform reserve price is the minimum clearing price for certain ad dimensions that mainly depending on ad size or site. Deal reserve price is associated with deal seat, these are pre-negotiated before campaign set up. Usually the lowest one is the system wide reserve price, roughly a few cents. In the exchange, we put requirements in response rate and other KPIs for DSP. In order to secure their spots in the system, some DSPs are submi ing extremely low bid for a large amount of auctions that they are not interested at all. e existence of system wide reserve can help reduce the number of bids considered for certain auctions and latency performance. e nal actual e ective reserve price is in general the maximal among all above static reserve prices that are quite conservative and are updated in a relatively long period based on platform statistics. Some platforms also use so reserve price, these type of reserve does not block any bids, but just provides a support for the transaction price. It will not incur any opportunity cost if the winner bids below the so reserve. Actually, when underbidding (top bid is lower than reserve) happens, the auction continues as if there is no reserve price. It is also common to use a combination of so and hard reserve prices, if the highest bid is above the hard reserve price but below the so reserve price the auction is run on rst price and the winners pay the exact amount they bid. One of the advantages of so reserve prices is that it won't bring opportunity cost when underbidding, however it it hard to predict the bidder behavior. Long termly speaking, bidders may nd they can win auctions at low price since underbidding does not result in losing auctions. One possible e ect what goes against seller's interest is that bidders keep shading their bids and push the average clearing price to lower levels.
In this paper, we will discuss how to nd the optimal hard reserve prices at impression level. We start by collecting data from the exchange and user pro le.
Features
We believe the value of an inventory depends both on its intrinsic characteristics and the buyers. From the raw data we ltered out some information that are ranked low for the price di erentiation and le with Table 1 .
Some of the characteristics in Table 1 have multiple features, such as in the previous win statistics for a user. e user stat includes previous maximum, average, total count of previous prices, also the running average can be over a group of numbers. One advantage of our model is that it does not rely on information about the losing bids. is gives more exibility of the model. If we only have DSP data, we can still run the model.
We categorize some features such as section id, site id and ad positions. Some feature are generated by grouping or binding and put into buckets. To name a few, we put thousands of buyer seats into 10 group of DSP buyers as AdNetwork, AgencyTradingDesk, DSP, DSPPowered, PersonalizedRetargeter, Adx, Gemini, Sidekick, YamPlus and notag. e age is grouped according to the following buckets: 0-17, 18-20, 21-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65+. e dow and date may help us re ect some periodic trends (weekly, quarterly, etc). We also cleaned the outlier bids that are higher than $41 (roughly 0.1% percentile) before feed the model.
A typical feature ranking is listed in Figure 1 for the two family of classi ers. From which we can see that the very top feature groups are highly correlated but with some internal di erence. is is reasonable since the highest bid and the huge bids gap are both random variables over the same bidding pool, bidders share a lot of common information from the bid request which determines the intrinsic value of the inventory. e di erentiation of bid prices are more relying on the bidder's interpretation and goals.
MODEL
One challenge in calculating the dynamic optimal reserve price is the opportunity cost. Let us assume there is no resell, consider a simple auction with top bid T = $5 (cpm, same for below) and second bid S = $2 respectively. When reserve price r is below $2, the impression will be sold at $2; if 2 ≤ r ≤ 5 the winner will pay r ; once r > 5 there will be no sell and the seller su ers an inventory loss. We can easily see that the ideal r should be between T and S and the higher the be er. However, this linear dependency between the revenue and r ends by a jump at T (see the thick black curve in Figure 2 ). Start from a conservative r , in the pursue of maximal revenue, r is pushed to be close to T . Since T can be over predicted (false positive) while the true top bid T is actually lower, an aggressive r may result in revenue dropping to zero for the particular auction. So the practical decision process will involve balancing of prediction accuracy and opportunity cost, and tuning between risk and expected revenue.
In our model, the calculation of r is based on our prediction of discretized T and their gap T − S. We essentially build several families of classi ers which are pre-trained using historical data. Each classi er is a cluster of regular machine learning models that are dedicated for xed feature set and dimensions of the response column. Although there are multiple buckets a er discretizing the winning price T , we are only interested in those high value buckets, thus the identi cation of high-value inventory is a binary decision. We also convert the gap T − S to a binary value (1 for signi cant 0 for not signi cant) by comparing it with a threshold. Further, we Price separation prediction. e rst family of classi ers are separation classi ers. We are aiming of identifying the price separations between the rst bid price and second bid price. e model will only calculate the reserve price for auctions that are labeled positive by separation classi er.
Winning bucket prediction. e second family of classi ers are prediction classi ers. Our new e ective reserve price is calculated based on the output of these classi ers. In the model, we discretize the winning price into di erent buckets, and the output will be the bucket ID that winning bid belongs to. Based on which we build the high value detection classi ers which collects votes from this prediction classi ers. e nal calculation of our reserve price depends on this bucket size. e two step model includes building of the single layer classi ers and the cascading algorithm. e cascading algorithm is inspired by Paul Viola and Michael Johns 's classic work [16] in image processing, whose method achieves both high e ciency and low false positive rate.
Single Classi er Performance
In the cascade procedures, we build strong classi ers in each stage. We pick a subset of features and train classi ers h j (weak learners) with the speci c feature set, then we use boosting [8] (developed by Freund and Schapire in 1990s) to combine these weak learners. e feature set varies for di erent learners. e boosting process essentially selects a set of good learners which nevertheless have signi cant variety. It is old but works very e ective in our case, the idea of the algorithm is to iteratively assign appropriate weights on each training examples (actually more weight on those training examples that are misclassi ed by the current weak hypothesis just produced and less weights on those training examples that are correctly classi ed so that the learner can focus on the hard to classify examples in the next iteration). Basic steps of this algorithm is as follows:
Let T be the number of loops, at stage t, we assign weight W t (·) to the training example i. e goal of the learning algorithm is to produce a hypothesis h t (·) such that the error at current stage is 1 Let T classi ers be h 1 , h 2 , · · · , h T 2 Training data (x 1 , 1 ), · · · , (x n , n ), i ∈ {+1, −1} 3 Initialize t = 1, W t (i) = 1 n , ∀i 4 For t = 1, 2, · · · , T : 5 use distribution W t to obtain classi er h t 6 calculate the error ϵ t and coe cient α t 7 update the weights for next iteration as W t +1 (i) = W t (i)e −α t i h t (x i ) 8 normalize W t +1 (i) so that it is a probability distribution, i.e., sum to be 1 9 Calculate the nal output H (x ) minimized:
Where (x i , i ) are the training data, 1 {·} is the indicator function, it equals to 1 if the argument in bracket is true, 0 otherwise. ϵ t is the probability of error of classi er h t (·), with respect to the distribution of weights W t (·). Since the weights are sum to be 1, thus this error is always in [0, 1]. Upon nishing of all the iterations (see Table 2 ), we combine the classi cation rules h t , t = 1, 2, ...,T and obtain a strong classi er
si n( ) is the sign function, it returns 1 if > 0, −1 otherwise. e coe cients α t are generated according to the errors as α t = 1 2 ln( 1−ϵ t ϵ t ). For any given x, H (x) will return a binary outcome depends on the sign of the weighted sum.
Another reason we choose boosting is that the training error approaches 0 exponentially in the number of rounds T . e performance of single classi ers for either high value identi cation and top prices separation are pre y good (see Figure 3 and 4 for the worst classi ers), especially for the high value identication classi ers, we have test AUC above 0.88. One may argue that AUC performance does not directly translate to revenue because we do not know enough about the potential loss on the false positive samples.
is is a serious concern and we did keep an eye on the projected revenue a er nishing training and testing of our classi ers, the detailed revenue impact results can be found in Section 4. 
Cascading Algorithm
As of now we have a bunch of classi ers for both high value detection and price separation. e goal of cascading [13] is to reduce the false positive rate of a prediction algorithm by combining a series of classi ers. We followed the basic idea in [16] with our own features and classi cation models. In order for a sample to be predicted as positive, all the classi ers in the cascading must predict it to be positive, otherwise it will be predicted as negative sample. In the training process, "a positive result from current classi er triggers the evaluation of the next classi er which has also been adjusted to achieve high detection rate. A positive result from the next classi er triggers a third classi er and so on". A negative outcome from any point leads to a termination of the chain and labelled as negative immediately. Subsequent classi ers are trained using the examples that pass through all the previous stages. And it is more and more di cult for the later classi ers to predict. e process is illustrated below, a series of classi ers are applied to each sample that passes all previous classi ers. Instead of pu ing simpler classi ers in the beginning, we choose smaller but important feature set for the classi ers at earlier stage so that they can eliminates a large number of negative samples in a relatively short time. Fewer and fewer samples survive a er several stages of processing, and are handed over to more complicated classi ers. See 3 for pseudocode. For a trained cascade of N classi ers, both the detection rate (D = N i=1 d i ) and false positive (F = N i=1 f i ) rate declined almost exponentially. Our main goal is to reduce the false positive rate (corresponding to the market share) to certain level while maintain as much detection rate (corresponding to revenue) as possible. e single classi ers must maintain a relative high detection rate so that the goal is achieved. For a 10 stage cascade with each classi er has the same detection rate 0.95 and false positive rate 0.52, the overall detection rate will be 0.95 10 ≈ 60% while the false positive rate will be 0.52 10 ≈ 0.14%. e training process of single classi er is aiming to minimize errors, not to achieve high detection rates at expense of large false positive rates. A straightforward trade o is to adjust the threshold of the decision rule produced by AdaBoost. In general, lower threshold yields classi er with more false positives and higher detection rate; higher threshold yields classi er with fewer false positives and a lower detection rate. 
train a classi er with C i features using P , N 12 calculate F i and D i 13 decrease threshold for ith classi er s.
apply classi er on true negative samples and put false prediction into N In the implementation of the algorithm, there are some parameters need to be tuned carefully. Our nal algorithm will be able to combine the following factors together and optimize the running time while achieving the detection rate and false positive rate goal, we have more parameters to handle than Viola and Jones [16] : e cuto threshold for signi cant price separation In the implementation, we manually set up the bounds for maximal accepted fpr (false positive rate) and minimum accepted detection rate or tpr (true positive rate). e reason we involve a manual process is that to nd an optimum combination of the above numbers is extremely hard, it does not worth pu ing the computation resource. Each layer of cascade is trained by AdaBoost with increasing number of features until the detection and false positive rates are met for that stage. en both rates are con rmed by testing on a validation data set. We also evaluate the overall false positive rate a er nishing training and testing one level, if the bound is not yet met, then another layer is added to the cascade. We put the false detections on the true negative set into the training set of subsequent classi ers. e two cuto thresholds also have a direct impact on seller revenue, we run a nite grid search for the optimal values, the results are shown in Section 4.
Note that in line 13 of Table 3 , updating threshold also impacts F j , so there is a risk to have a endless loop. In practice, this is not a problem to us since we have a realistic F T GT with our cascading classi ers.
SIMULATION RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
One simple and fast way of implementing this model for testing is to enforce the predicted oor prices in selling rule for a portion of the tra c. For a online A|B test, we update the selling rule in the keys that have the following six dimensions: hour, gob (group of buyers), siteid, adsize, adpos, state. In our system, more than 80% of the tra c condensed on about 1200 keys. We noticed that on those keys, high-value inventories are highly condensed, and these 1200 keys consists of about 60% of the total high-value tra c. e revenue li is around 3.5% using our trained classi ers in the cascade model. When underbid happens, we actually route part of the blocked tra c to other platforms for reselling. e revenue from blocked tra c is provided by the third party with delay, so we do not include this part of revenue in our simulation results.
In Table 4 , we show one simulation results on a random 10% sample and are able to achieve around $1000 li on the e ected auctions (the revenue on the un-e ected auctions le unchanged), which converts to a 3.5% global li . e portion of high-value inventories in the marketplace is relative small. For instance, auctions with top bid above $10 is about 5%, but it contributes 40% total revenue. Although the revenue li is around 3.5% for the marketplace, it is pre y stable over a long period with uctuations around 0.3%. Given the size of our exchange revenue on display ads, it translates to an extra two dozens of million dollars in a yearly basis. Currently, we are slowly push the model to the production with small tra c, as of now we have used only three level of cascading to reach this, and we implement our model in an extremely conservative way. Usually the higher false positive results in higher resell rate, in order to maintain certain marketshare level we put a rm constrain on the fpr. As a consequence, we sacri ce the detection rate as much as possible to meet this goal even though we can further grow our sell revenue by abandoning this constrain.
Future concerns about this system may include studying of the long term behavior of bidders, it is possible that some bidders will shade their bids a er noticing that they are paying a higher prices for this high-value inventories. However, a er bid shadings, bidders may lose some auctions and potentially boost the shaded bids to a higher level. It is hard to predict the consequence of this mechanism, but it will de nitely put some e ects on the total revenue we can draw from this model.
Another note we would like to add is that there is still large potential for the cascading model to achieve be er revenue performance. Due to engineering limitations, we haven't make fully use of Yahoo's user pro le data in this model. Some important user features that we used in ads targeting are absent, such as the user segment, content taxonomy, beacon events, etc. By adding those feature, we may build more accurate classi ers.
